

I2P, The Invisible Internet Projekt

jem

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- ▶ Just finished BSc Informatik at BFH
- ▶ Bachelor Thesis: "Analysis of the I2P Network"
- ▶ Focused on information gathering inside and evaluation of possible attacks against I2P
- ▶ Presumes basic knowledge about I2P
- ▶ Contact: jens@jabber.chaostreffbern.ch (XMPP) or jens@jenix.net (GPG 0x28562678)



Similar to TOR...

- ▶ Goal: provide anonymous communication over the Internet
- ▶ Traffic routed across multiple peers
- ▶ Layered Encryption
- ▶ Provides Proxies and APIs

...but also different

- ▶ Designed as overlay network (strictly separated network on top of the Internet)
- ▶ No central authority
- ▶ Every peer participates in routing traffic
- ▶ Provides integrated services: Webserver, E-Mail, IRC, BitTorrent
- ▶ Much smaller and less researched

Introduction

About I2P: Basic Facts



- ▶ I2P build in Java (C++ implementation I2Pd available)
- ▶ Available for all major OS (Linux, Windows, MacOS, Android)
- ▶ Small project → slow progress, chaotic documentation, ...
- ▶ Core team consists of few people "spread around several continents", many vacant positions
- ▶ Volatile services: many dead links, announced services / websites / project with unknown status (probably dead)
- ▶ I2P is becoming more popular, especially with growing concerns about TOR's security (First Darknet Shops migrating to I2P)
- ▶ I2P seems to be quite popular in the Russian-speaking part of the world (many websites in Cyrillic)



- ▶ Project started in 2003
- ▶ Major throw back in November 2007, when lead developer (jrandom) left the project, took important infrastructure with him (including official website i2p.net) and since disappeared
- ▶ Lots of reorganizing needed afterwards (new website, new release keys, etc.), slowed the development of I2P down
- ▶ Today: v0.9.26 (2016-06-07), deemed stable and secure by devs, though no complete code review done (yet)
- ▶ Target: New version every 6 - 8 weeks (currently behind schedule)




- ▶ Hard to guess amount of users or services
- ▶ Some numbers:
 - ▶ Amount of simultaneous routers observed during Thesis: about 6000 - 7000 (stable), but accuracy of this number unknown
 - ▶ Number dropped to 1000 - 1500 currently, but may be even more inaccurate due to changes in the network
 - ▶ Current entries in official Addressbook: 368, but many sites unreachable (may be temporary or permanent)




- ▶ Participating peers called Routers
- ▶ Eepsite: Service accessible via I2P
- ▶ Identity: SHA256-Hash of encryption keys
- ▶ 2 types of identifier inside the network:
 - ▶ routerInfo: Identity, IP-Address and Port of router (used to contact a Router)
 - ▶ leaseSet: Identity, Tunnel-Gateway and Tunnel-ID of service (used to contact a Service)


- ▶ Like circuits in TOR
- ▶ Fix set of routers used to forward traffic (default: 3 per tunnel)
- ▶ 2 Types: Inbound for receiving, Outbound for sending packets
- ▶ Created by every router
- ▶ Valid for 10 Minutes (then new ones are created)
- ▶ Multiple tunnels per service
- ▶ Gateway: First router of a tunnel
- ▶ Endpoint: Last router of a tunnel
- ▶ Unique Tunnel-ID
- ▶ Gateway and Tunnel-ID part of leaseSet



Inbound:



Outbound:



- ▶ Router collects routerInfos from netDB and selects participants of tunnel
- ▶ Computes the creation message for each participant and sends it to first router
- ▶ This one learns that a new tunnel is being created and forwards the message
- ▶ Every participant only learns, that he should forward packets from the previous router to the next one (identified by Tunnel-ID)
- ▶ Only our Router knows that he is the endpoint respectively the gateway


- ▶ Contains contact information for all routers and services (routerInfos and leaseSets)
- ▶ Distributed database: spread across participating routers (called floodfill routers)
- ▶ floodfill routers automatically selected based on capabilities or if they volunteer
- ▶ Kademlia DHT approach: Identifier mapped to an address space, the 7 "closest" floodfill routers are used to store entries
- ▶ If floodfill router does not have the requested entry (so it is not one of the 7 closest), it knows floodfill routers that are closer and redirects to them
- ▶ Kademlia DHT to be replaced by other mechanism in the future due to possible attacks against it (control the 7 closest floodfill routers)
- ▶ Demo: netDB entries in I2P Router Console

- ▶ Destination: leaseSet “name”, encoded in base32 / base64
- ▶ Example: uwyqjovhwu2vsam7ijqxzzuwvwueu3rza5b7hphmgjunbflgldvua.b32.i2p
- ▶ Destination hard to remember
- ▶ Use resolver hostname → destination (like DNS)
- ▶ Done by Addressbook
- ▶ Public part (synchronized with published entries)
- ▶ Private part (higher priority during lookup)
- ▶ All entries modifiable, possibility to publish entries
- ▶ Jump Services provide resolving (like public DNS servers)
- ▶ Demo: Addressbook entries in I2P Router Console / Jump Services




- ▶ Real address of service: destination (leaseSet)
- ▶ Opt: Resolve hostname → destination via Addressbook
- ▶ leaseSet queried from NetDB
- ▶ Tunnel information (Gateway and Tunnel-ID) extracted from leaseSet
- ▶ NetDB lookup for routerInfo of Gateway
- ▶ Send packets to Gateway using Outbound Tunnel

- ▶ 2 different encryption schemes
- ▶ AES256-CBC with session key inside tunnel
- ▶ Layered Encryption: apply multiple layers of encryption for each hop in the tunnel
- ▶ ElGamal outside tunnels (NetDB lookups, transport between tunnels)
- ▶ Public Key in Identity
- ▶ Message Authentication with EdDSA25519 signatures
- ▶ Signing Key in Identity
- ▶ Daily key-rollover



- ▶ Term based on „Onion Routing“ (TOR)
- ▶ Multiple meanings:
 - ▶ Combine multiple messages for the same recipient
 - ▶ Protect message with multi-layered encryption
 - ▶ Use both AES and ElGamal encryption
- ▶ Goal: prevent Timing Attacks (finding paths by correlating incoming and outgoing packets)



- ▶ I2P uses self-developed protocols
- ▶ "Management" protocols:
 - ▶ I2CP (I2P Client Protocol, let application communicate via I2P)
 - ▶ I2NP (I2P Network Protocol, used to manage I2P network itself)
- ▶ Transport protocols:
 - ▶ NTCP (Java-NIO based TCP)
 - ▶ SSU (Secure Semi-reliable UDP)
- ▶ Full documentation on I2P Website

Streaming	Datagrams
I2CP	
Garlic encryption	
Tunnel messages	
NTCP	SSU
TCP	UDP
IP	

I2P offers many different Services

- ▶ Hosting / Browsing
- ▶ eMail: susimail (postman over I2P) & I2P-Bote (Kademlia DHT-based mail system)
- ▶ Chat: IRC (with Relay-Bots between I2P and the Internet), Jabber & I2P-Messenger (serverless, based on destination keys)
- ▶ Filesharing: integrated BitTorrent-client "I2PSnark", additional programs (e.g. iMule) → provides "base" traffic
- ▶ Blogs / Forums: Syndie
- ▶ "Cloud": Tahoe-LAFS cloud over I2P
- ▶ Unofficial gateways to www and TOR
- ▶ Adapt own application to use I2P



I2P provides different APIs to use it with any application

- ▶ I2PTunnel translates ip:port into I2P destination
- ▶ SOCKS Proxy
- ▶ SAM v3: Libraries for C, C++, Go and Haskell
- ▶ BOB: Library for Go, Python, Twisted
- ▶ I2PControl: JSON-RPC2 interface to control I2P router from within an application
- ▶ Full documentation for every API on I2P website

- ▶ TOR-Browser can be configured to use both TOR and I2P by using the extension FoxyProxy (Caution: Third-Party extension). Tutorial:
<http://thetinh.at/i2p/tutorials/darknets/i2p-browser-setup-guide.html>
- ▶ eepstatus (List of available I2P sites): <http://identiguy.i2p>
- ▶ Access Eepsites from the Internet by adding .xyz: e.g. site.i2p → site.i2p.xyz (not working for every site)
- ▶ I2P Observer (Result of my Thesis to gather information about I2P):
<https://jenix.net/i2p-observer>



Pro:

- ▶ Small project
- ▶ Not (yet) in focus of surveillance (?)
- ▶ Many great ideas to strengthen security (Personal impression after Thesis)
- ▶ Developers are aware of possible problems:
 - ▶ early switches to strong cryptography
 - ▶ fast responses to possible issues (e.g. disabling potential insecure ciphers)
- ▶ Diversity always desirable
- ▶ Many build-in services and easy adaptation for any application

Conclusion

Should I use I2P?



Con:

- ▶ No proof of security yet (Missing code audit)
- ▶ Much smaller network (therefor easier to monitor)
- ▶ Major changes needed to address published attack possibilities (focused mainly on netDB)
- ▶ Visible I2P network often feels deserted

Conclusion

Should I use I2P?



So, should I use I2P?

- ▶ Depends on your personal stance towards Pros and Cons.
- ▶ If you want to: <https://www.geti2p.net>